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Abstract
A wealth of protocols for electronic voting have been proposed in
the literature over the past years. What makes these protocols diffi-
cult to conceive and verify is one fundamental property, anonymity,
which is of paramount importance in the real world, in particular
when performing actual political elections.
Historically, certain techniques have been used in actual elections
to nullify anonymity and effectively coerce voters, by exploiting an
evident weakness in many voting protocols; these techniques were
used in traditional elections well before the notion of electronic vot-
ing was even proposed, yet, they still seem to be little known: as a
consequence, we find recent proposals of voting protocols that can
easily be attacked this way, like [Riv06], or clever attempts at for-
mal definitions of privacy and anonymity properties that would not
rule out such flawed protocols, like [DKR06].
In this paper, we describe one old technique, effectively used in
Italy over twenty years ago, and show how the flaws or incomplete-
ness in current protocols and formalization can be clearly exposed
just through that simple idea.
We also show how this very same simple attack can be effectively
used today on US-style elections, regardless of the presence of a
VVPB or VVPT.
We hope that a wide circulation of this simple ideas will help
design better protocols and formalization in the near future.
Keywords: privacy, anonymity, electronic voting, voting, signature
attack
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1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature on voting and elections, which is
not surprising, since the need to perform voting dates far back in hu-
man history1. The study of voting is a particularly complex subject,
that has raised interest among scientists in very different disciplines,
ranging from philosophy, to politics, economics, and finally, more
recently, computer science. The aspects of voting that are taken into
account in each of these disciplines are quite different: some focus
on designing a voting method that properly capture the interest of
the population that votes; in computer science, one mainly focus on
the security properties that a particular protocol used to implement
a vote must satisfy.
It is this author’s humble opinion that these different communities
act as if these different aspects were orthogonal; this author strongly
believes that relevant properties of the voting systems are not or-
thogonal: one cannot really build secure voting protocols without
knowing the details of the voting method, and there is no point in
designing a perfectly fair voting method if it makes it difficult to
provide a secure implementation, as then its theoretical fairness will
be practically impaired.
In this paper, we will first survey a few ideas and results coming
from both the security and social welfare approaches, then tell the
story of an old trick used in Italy over twenty years ago to break se-
curity of a voting method; the basic idea used in this old trick will
allow us to construct an effective attack against the Three Ballot
scheme recently proposed by Ronald Rivest [Riv06], to construct
an attack on any simplistic implementation of the very appealing
voting method proposed by Balinski and Laraki just a few months
ago [BL06], to uncover a possible attack in all US-style aggregated
elections, and finally to show the inadequacy of recent attempt at
the formalization of the privacy property, like the one proposed, for
example, in [DKR06].
As the reader will see, the fundamental idea is really a simple one,
and this author discussed the Italian trick at length with many col-
leagues over the past ten years, but it is quite surprising to see
that its basic principle are seemingly ignored by most concerned
researchers today, hence the need for this exposition.
In the following, we will use terms like voting method, voting pro-
tocol, and voting scheme, which are often used interchangeably in
the literature, with a more specific meaning:
voting method will indicate those aspect of a voting system that
are mostly concerned with defining the rules to choose the
1In ancient Greece, for example, shards of pottery (oστρακα)
were used to mark votes to decide whether to ban an individual
from the community, hence the term ostracism.
winner(s): there are a wide range of such methods in use to-
day, proportional, single winner, single non transferable vote,
etc.
voting protocol will indicate those aspect of a voting system that
are mostly concerned with the implementation procedures of
a voting system: mechanisms for determining eligibility of
voters, anonymity, verifiability, etc. fall here;
voting scheme will be used where the frontier among method and
protocol is blurred (for example, some voting protocols really
are designed to implement just one particular voting method)
1.1 Voting protocols studied from the security
point of view
There are quite a few studies dedicated to voting fraud at different
moments in history [Ste57], and where there is fraud, there is a need
for security engineering.
This author found it difficult to identify systematic publications de-
voted to the analysis of the specific security problems posed by
the actual design and implementation of voting procedures before
the advent of computers, and it may be the case that the nature of
these problems and their old origins make the relevant considera-
tions kind of folklore: it is easy to find evidence in the electoral
codes of many countries (for example, see [Ghe02] for a discussion
of the security provisions devised in France ) that there is a long
standing consensus on the fact that any particular voting procedure
used for political elections should at least guarantee the following
properties:
anonymity the choice made by each voter is not disclosed to any-
one
eligibility only legitimate voters can vote, according to the partic-
ular voting rules of the election, and all legitimate voters can
vote
fairness to avoid influencing the remaining voters, no partial re-
sults can be disclosed2
public verifiability the voting process is open to public scrutiny so
that anyone can become confident that her vote was actually
counted and that the announced outcome corresponds to the
votes actually made.
Due to the wide variety of voting practices in different countries,
attacks on these basic properties are also quite diverse. Until
2003, the implementation of political elections in France analyzed
in [Ghe02] gave good guarantees on anonymity, fairness and pub-
lic verifiability, while it was seriously flawed concerning eligibility.
Alleged eligibility fraud was also at the center of much debate in
Florida during the 2000 US presidential elections.
In different occasions, anonymity has been reported to be at-
tacked, even if the effectiveness and implementability of such at-
tacks deeply depended on the particular details of the voting proce-
dure [Jon05], or the level of coercion that can be exerted ostensibly
without nullifying the election outcome (typically, in developing
countries).
In computer science, voting protocols became an interesting object
of study with the discovery of public key cryptography, when many
2This is not so consensual a property as it might seem, as some
authors have proposed to let the voters change their choice continu-
ously over a period of time, according to partial results, even if this
author could find no evidence of the actual usage of such systems
in political elections.
researches started looking for a way to reproduce in a purely elec-
tronic voting method, possibly enabling remote voting, the same
security properties that are reasonably assumed with physical vot-
ing.
Due to the unique combination of security requirements that arise
in the design and implementation of voting protocols, and in partic-
ular with remote voting, this quest is far from being concluded, and
along the way a certain amount of extra properties of an (electronic)
voting system have been formulated, which are intuitively sub-
sumed by the anonymity property above (each of these properties
breaks anonymity), but make sense in an electronic setting, where
the attackers may have significant more ways to disrupt anonymity:
receipt freeness : a voter cannot prove to a third party, after the
vote, that she voted in a certain way [BT94];
coercion-resistance : a voter cannot prove to a third party that
she voted in a certain way, even if the third party is al-
lowed to electronically interact with her during the voting
process [JCJ02].
Looking at the long list of papers published with protocol proposals
that were proven flawed just a few month after their publication3,
one can get a clear idea of how difficult the problem is.
This quite unsatisfactory state of affairs prompted for some for-
mal methods to enter the scene: a seminal work in this direction is
that by Lowe [Low95] and recently, some notable work advocates
the use of variants of the pi-calculus to formalize the definitions
of these properties, and make them suitable for machine verifica-
tion [KR05].
What is quite striking in most studies concerning the security as-
pects of (electronic) vote is the fact that one does not care much
about the actual content of a ballot, nor on the particular aggrega-
tion function used to obtain the final result of the election: these
are considered details that can be abstracted away for the sake of
the security analysis; in many cases, it is simply assumed that the
ballot is just a yes/no choice, and the result is simply the sum of the
ballots (yes counting as a one and no as zero) [Sch99].
As we will see in the next section, these details are actually ex-
tremely important from the political, economical, social and math-
ematical point of view, so one cannot assume that if some security
properties of a voting protocol on one hand, and some fundamental
properties of a voting method on the other hand turn out to conflict,
it will be the latter that will have to be adapted.
1.2 Voting methods studied from the ethical or
social welfare point of view
Philosophers, politicians and economists focus on building voting
methods with good ethical properties, which can be formalized
mathematically as a quest for a function that transform a set of
individual preferences into a global ranking of the candidates
having some good properties that model the common interest;
in these disciplines, it is common to see the term social welfare
function used to denote them.
A particularly significant period for the analysis and discussion of
voting methods is the 18th century, when Nicolas de Condorcet,
a french nobleman and distinguished mathematician, devoted a
number of studies to the problem of finding an election method
that guaranteed an outcome representative of the voters’ will. He
observed, in particular, a significant shortcoming of single-winner
election methods, where each voter votes for just one choice, and
3See for example the history of receipt-freeness reported in the
introduction of [BT94]
the winner is whomever gets more votes: it may well be the case
that the winner so selected is actually the least preferred in the
population. This is best seen in an example: suppose that we have
a race among three candidates, Adam, Bill and Cynthia, and the
real feeling of the voters is represented as follows
20 Adam Bill Cynthia
15 Cynthia Bill Adam
10 Bill Cynthia Adam
Since each voter can only cast one preference, Adam will win with
20 votes, followed by Cynthia with 15 and Bill with 10. The polit-
ical commentators will then conclude that Adam is preferred over
Cynthia, and Cynthia is preferred to Bill.
But if one looks at the real feelings of the voters, it is easy to see
that:
• 30 people prefer Bill to Cynthia, while only 15 prefer Cynthia
to Bill;
• 25 people prefer Bill to Adam, while only 20 prefer Adam to
Bill;
• 25 prefer Cynthia to Adam, while only 20 prefer Adam to
Cynthia.
So it would be more representative to have Bill ranked first, fol-
lowed by Cynthia and Adam last, that is, the exact inverse of the
result of the single-winner method.
Condorcet concluded that it was necessary, if one really wants to
get a representative outcome from an election, to choose a voting
method where the voters can express all of their preferences, in
ranked order.
He also managed to show that this is far from sufficient: after
proposing a particular voting method, the Condorcet method, he
uncovered what is known as Condorcet’s paradox: there are cases
where even using his method, we cannot pick a clear winner; for
example, with the following voting outcome it is the case that Bill
is preferred to Cynthia, which is preferred to Adam, which is pre-
ferred to Bill:
20 Adam Bill Cynthia
15 Cynthia Bill Adam
10 Bill Cynthia Adam
6 Cynthia Adam Bill
Indeed, we have
• 30 people prefer Bill to Cynthia, while only 21 prefer Cynthia
to Bill;
• 31 prefer Cynthia to Adam, while only 20 prefer Adam to
Cynthia.
• 26 people prefer Adam to Bill, while only 25 prefer Bill to
Adam.
We can even have situations where the apparent winner is really
hiding a perfect tie, like in the following example where Ada, Bill
and Cynthia really split the population’s will (checking this is left
as an exercise to the reader):
20 Adam Bill Cynthia
20 Bill Adam Cynthia
20 Cynthia Adam Bill
20 Cynthia Bill Adam
This rather unsatisfactory state of affairs led to the proposal of a
wealth of different voting methods that try to cope with this para-
dox, including one from Borda, a contemporary of Condorcet’s;
we now know, thanks to a result of Kenneth Arrow [Arr51], Nobel
Prize for economics in 1972, that no voting method exists, based
on the assumption that the voters can only express their preferences
with a ranked list of candidates, that satisfies all of the following
reasonable assumptions one might expect of an election, as soon as
there are at least three candidates:
Unanimity if every voter prefers A to B, than in the election result
A is better ranked than B
Non dictatorship there is no voter whose choice can systemati-
cally alter the election result
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives whether A is ranked
above B in the election outcome depends only on the voters’
ranking of A respective to B (so, adding or removing the rank-
ing of an extra candidate C, all the rest being equal, must not
change the order of A and B in the result).
This might explain why we find around the world today quite a
large number of voting methods, chosen according to the different
appreciation of the importance of each feature of a voting method
(and there are much more features than just the three above): most
of them have in common the possibility for the voter to express her
preferences via a ranked list of candidates (the length of this list
may be constrained, for example, to one, but the above exposition
clearly state that such a limitation leads to the worst election sys-
tem), and many of the differences are to be found in the algorithm
used to compute the outcome of the election.
As we will see in the next section, some of these variants allow to
easily and blatantly break privacy.
Very recently, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki made a clear analy-
sis of the roots of the limitations of voting systems based on prefer-
ences expressed solely by means of ranked lists of candidates, and
show in [BL06] that one can avoid Arrow’s limiting result with vot-
ing methods that allow each voter to express her view of a candidate
in a more refined way, by grading each candidate, using a common
language4. For a detailed exposition of their proposal, the majority
ranking, we refer the interested reader to [BL06]; for the purpose
of the present work, it will suffice to remember that this method re-
quires that the voter grade every candidate.
As we will see in what follows, naı¨ve implementations of this
method allow to easily break privacy.
Finally, independently on the voting method chosen, it is the case,
most notably in the US, that the authorities try to reduce costs, and
increase voter participation, by federating together unrelated elec-
tions: one may find in the same ballot on major elections in the
US questions ranging from the choice of the next President of the
United States, next to questions about homosexual marriage, or the
local sheriff, which definitely do not carry the same weight.
As we will see in what follows, this practice also allows to easily
break privacy, no matter what the voting method for each individual
question is.
4Grading is more powerful than ranking; we all know how to
rank students, given their grades, but it is quite another task to ex-
tract a grade from a ranking: knowing that A is considered better
than B tells us nothing on the absolute value of A on a ranking
scale.
There is a lesson to be learned from this exposition: election sys-
tems based on simplistic yes/no choices, even if actually used in
practice, like in the French two round system, or worse, in the UK
single run system, definitely represent the worst, least satisfactory
election system of all, from the social welfare point of view, so it
is definitely not acceptable to limit research in computer science to
electronic voting protocols that are thoroughly studied only in the
case of yes/no choices.
1.3 Additional implementation details
When proceeding to implement a voting system used for political
elections, one is faced with quite a lot of additional practical design
choices which may seem marginal, but are of paramount impor-
tance, and are well known to political parties.
The first of these practicalities is the necessity to choose a method
to assign political representatives to geographical areas; for this, the
global territory where elections are performed is divided into elec-
toral districts5, each district being assigned one or more seats.
Second, each district is subdivided into many electoral precincts6,
which is the area corresponding to one single polling station; its
size is the number of voters that are eligible to vote in that area.
The typical size of an electoral precinct is around 1000, while elec-
toral districts have sizes that vary widely depending on the country
(in France, there are around 100.000 voters in a district), and the
importance of the way the territory is divided into districts is well
known to all politicians.
2 An old attack on the ranked voting method
in Italy
The Italian law fixing the voting method for the election of the
chamber is the Testo unico delle leggi elettorali, which was first
established in the Decreto del Presidente de la Repubblica del 30
marzo 1957, n. 361, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 139,
the 3rd of June 1957. This law has undergone a wealth of modifi-
cations over the years, but at the time of reference that this author
recall for the fraud in object (in the 70s and 80s), it was consistently
the case that representatives of the parliament were elected with a
proportional method, that can be simplified as follows:
• there are a few large electoral districts, and each of them is
assigned a number of seats that will be given to the candidates
with the best scores
• in each district, every party may present a ranked list of can-
didates
• by means of a special ballot, the voter chooses a party, and
can either agree on the ranking of the candidates proposed
by the party, or optionally express different preferences with
respect to the party’s proposal, by marking a (limited) list of
candidates, out of the chosen party’s list, in any order she likes
• a rather complex algorithm is then used to determine the win-
ners in the district; the details of such algorithms are out of
the scope of this paper, but it suffices to know that the party
with more votes will have more seats, and for each party, the
candidate with more preferences (either explicitly marked by
the voters, or implicitly indicated by the party’s ranked list)
will have more chances to get a seat.
5French: circonscription e´le´ctorale, Italian: circoscrizione elet-
torale, possibly divided into collegi elettorali
6French: bureau de vote; Italian: seggio elettorale
To give an idea of what a paper ballot looked like in the Italian
elections, I present in figure 1 an actual ballot still used for the Eu-
ropean elections today. The voter chooses a party by drawing a
cross on the party’s symbol, and may optionally express a number
of ranked preferences by writing down candidate names on the lines
on the right of the party’s symbol. In the current European election
method the number of these preferences is limited to three; in the
Italian parliamentary elections in the 80’s the voter could express
up to 4 preferences and lists with over 40 candidates were com-
monplace.
Figure 1. Facsimile of a paper ballot for european elections used
in Italy
2.1 Voiding anonymity by converting the bal-
lot into a signature
This author was unfortunately unable to find an online reference to
the fraud that was unveiled sometime in the 80’s in Italy7, and led to
the modification of the election procedures that reduced the number
of preferences to only one8, even if they still can express three in
the european election, but the following story should not be too far
from the actual events (if you have an Italian friend over 40 years
old, he will remember it too).
In various towns, it had been observed a high number of votes for
the local political boss during the elections conducted using paper
ballots similar to the one in figure 1, with the possibility of express-
ing up to 4 preferences. It was also observed a high usage rate of
preferences in the ballots.
Taken together, these hints may be interpreted as pointing to some
kind of fraud being performed taking advantage of the preferences
system, but it is not evident: after all, a high usage rate of prefer-
ences may simply indicate that preferences are useful for the voters,
and hence used! Indeed, it took a long time before the actual fraud
procedure was largely understood, leading to a change of the sys-
tem: the father of this author served as a volunteer officer in an
electoral precinct for over 20 years, and actually recalls remarking
in several occasion people taking notes of the preferences expressed
in the votes during the public counting phase, but only realized what
was going on when the whole affair become public in the ’80s.
The actual fraud procedure can be reconstructed as follows:
• the boss is candidate C1 in the list of candidates C1, . . . ,Cn of
the fraud party PF ;
7The author would be very grateful to whomever may have a
copy of the old newspaper articles, and would be so kind to scan
and send him a copy.
8Actually, since the last reform, in 2006, preferences are gone
altogether.
• before the elections, the boss, accompanied by Carlo and Gio-
vanni, two well built, massive bodyguards with black suits
and sunglasses, makes a courtesy visit to a sizeable number of
electors susceptible of not voting for party PF ;
• in each visit, he instructs elector Ek to vote for PF and ex-
press preferences C1,Cσk(2),Cσk(3),Cσk(4), in this precise or-
der, where each σk : 2 · · ·4→ 2 · · ·n is a different injection of
the interval 2 · · ·4 into the interval 2 · · ·n;
• he then tells Ek that, in case a ballot with this precise sequence
of preferences does not come up during the tallying operations
(that are, of course, public and publicly verifiable), Carlo and
Giovanni will pay Ek a visit to make sure she will exhibit bet-
ter memory efficiency when the next election will come;
• now, either Ek has some basic mathematical skills and is able
to assess precisely her chances to disobey the boss’ instruc-
tions, and complies, or she has not; in this second case, she
may try her chance at disobeying the first time, but will com-
ply after Carlo and Giovanni’s visit.
To subsume this story, the possibility for the voter to express com-
plex preferences allows to construct a signature out of the very con-
tent of the ballot, so that a fraud is easily set up by assigning each
voter a different signature to check that she obeys the instructions,
and all this without changing the overall outcome of the election
(the boss will be elected no matter the order of the preferences of
inferior weight).
2.2 Assessing the attack’s effectiveness
In case Ek has some mathematical skills, and wants to take a chance
to disobey, she will first assess the seriousness of the boss’ threat,
and the risk she incurs of being discovered by the boss.
First of all, she will try and check if it is really the case that the boss
has found a space large enough to provide a different signature for
every voter. For this, she has readily available a few informations:
• how many people vote in her same precinct: this varies from
country to country, but in Italy the average number is N =
1.000, and is usually less than that;
• the list of candidates from which to choose the Cσk (i) is on
the average of length 40
The boss can produce as many signatures as there are different ways
of choosing the 3 meaningless candidates out of the 39 which are
left after putting the boss as the first of the 4 allowed preferences.
This gives
3!
(
40
3
)
= 59280
different signatures, which is largely enough to cover 1.000 voters
(a list of 13 names would be already enough), so the boss has a
point.
Our voter now turns to assessing the actual risk of being caught in
case she decides to disobey nonetheless: the only way she will not
be discovered is when somebody else will actually cast a vote for
PF with exactly her assigned preferences C1,Cσk(2),Cσk(3),Cσk(4);
how likely it is that nobody of the N voters actually cast this vote?
Supposing (which is far from being reasonable) that votes are uni-
formly distributed, the probability that all of the N voters cast a vote
different from C1,Cσk(2),Cσk(3),Cσk(4) is(
V −1
V
)N
where V is the number of possible different votes. The actual value
of V depends on the number P of parties, and the number np of
candidates in each party’s list; under the assumption that the voters
cannot express more than 4 preferences, this amounts to
V =
P
∑
p=1
(A0np +A
1
np +A
2
np +A
3
np +A
4
np)
=
P
∑
p=1
(1+
np!
(np−1)! +
np!
(np−2)! +
np!
(np−3)! +
np!
(np−4)! )
As our voter knows exactly P and all the values np, she can com-
pute this probability, either precisely, if she has access to a good
computer with an arbitrary precision arithmetic library, or via the
approximation (valid for N/V small, which was the case in Italy for
N = 1000 and np = 40).(
V −1
V
)N
=
(
1− 1
V
)N
≈ 1−N/V
In table 1 we give some values of this probability, for a race with
just ten parties (at the time, in Italy, ten parties were a minimum,
and if you look at the specimen of paper ballot for last european
elections, things are not getting any better), but also for a race with
just one party.
As you can see, the probability of getting caught decreases as the
number of voters increases and increases as the length of the list or
the number of parties grows, which corresponds to the intuition that
the chances of finding a saver decrease when there are more choices
for the votes, and less voters around.
Even under the unrealistically optimistic assumptions that all votes
are equi-probable, with lists of length 40 and a precinct size of
1.000 our potential hero has vanishingly small chances of avoiding
Carlo and Giovanni’s visit if she does not comply with the boss’
order.
It is clear that if a sizeable amount of the voters decide to comply,
our hero’s chances are quite smaller: all voters that comply cast a
vote different from C1,Cσk(2),Cσk(3),Cσk(4), so that we can effec-
tively subtract their number from N, and look up again table 1 to
assess the damage.
The little calculations of this section show that the boss has man-
aged to void anonymity by turning the very ballot into an extremely
effective voter signature9.
To summarize the findings of this section
REMARK 1. When the space of possible votes is large enough to
construct a unique signature for each voter in the voting precinct,
and the probability of a collision of the publicly verifiable ballots
in the precinct is low, then anonymity can be voided, no matter how
the voting protocol is designed.
So, contrarily to what is implicitly assumed in a vast literature on
security of voting protocols, details of the voting “method” (as op-
posed to the voting “protocol”), do matter when assessing the secu-
rity of the system.
9A colleague of mine recently told me that he knew one of the
engineers that were asked by some political parties to perform these
calculations in the south of Italy back in the ’80s. . .
Candidates Precinct PC PC
size 10 parties 1 party
40 100 0.999996 0.999956
40 1000 0.999956 0.999556
40 2000 0.999911 0.999113
40 3000 0.999867 0.998670
40 4000 0.999823 0.998227
40 5000 0.999778 0.997784
30 100 0.999985 0.999854
30 1000 0.999854 0.998537
30 2000 0.999707 0.997076
30 3000 0.999561 0.995617
30 4000 0.999415 0.994160
30 5000 0.999268 0.992706
20 100 0.999919 0.999191
20 1000 0.999191 0.991937
20 2000 0.998382 0.983939
20 3000 0.997574 0.976005
20 4000 0.996767 0.968135
20 5000 0.995960 0.960329
10 100 0.998295 0.983081
10 1000 0.983083 0.843130
10 2000 0.966452 0.710869
10 3000 0.950102 0.599355
10 4000 0.934029 0.505334
10 5000 0.918227 0.426062
5 100 0.952604 0.614701
5 1000 0.615356 0.007703
5 2000 0.378663 0.000059
5 3000 0.233012 0.000000
5 4000 0.143385 0.000000
5 5000 0.088233 0.000000
4 100 0.857302 0.212159
4 1000 0.214457 0.000000
4 2000 0.045992 0.000000
4 3000 0.009863 0.000000
4 4000 0.002115 0.000000
4 5000 0.000454 0.000000
Table 1. Exact probability of getting caught when disobeying
the boss, assuming a limit of 4 expressed preferences in the race,
as a function of the number of candidates, the precinct size and
the number of parties in the race.
Add a footnote somewhere to explain the trick for voiding votes in France. . .
3 Signature attack on Rivest’s Three Ballot
voting protocol
In a recent paper, Ronald Rivest proposed a paper ballot voting
protocol inspired by ideas coming from cryptographic voting
protocols designed for electronic voting [Riv06]. The essential
idea is to try and provide a voting protocol that will allow the voter
to come back from the voting booth bringing with him a piece
of information that is not enough to discover the vote cast, but
allows the voter, with high probability, to detect any malevolent
manipulation of the tally that would have as effect of ignoring her
particular vote.
We will not reproduce here the discussion of the protocol, for which
we refer the reader to the original paper, but we only resume the
BALLOT
... BALLOT
... BALLOT
...
...
President
...President
...President
Alex Jones # ... Alex Jones # ... Alex Jones #
Bob Smith # ... Bob Smith # ... Bob Smith #
Carol Wu # ... Carol Wu # ... Carol Wu #
Senator
...Senator
...Senator
Dave Yip # ... Dave Yip # ... Dave Yip #
Ed Zinn # ... Ed Zinn # ... Ed Zinn #
...
...
3147524
... 7523416
... 5530219
Figure 2. A sample multi-ballot from the Three Ballot voting
protocol
voting steps:
1. the voter gets an empty multi-ballot,
2. to vote FOR a candidate, she fills with her black pencil exactly
two of the # next to the name of that candidate
3. to vote AGAINST (or not vote for) a candidate, she fills with
her black pencil exactly one of the # next to the name of that
candidate
4. it is not allowed to leave empty all the # corresponding to a
candidate, or to fill all three of them; after being filled in, the
multi-ballot would look like the one in figure 3
5. a special machine (which may look like the ones used to read
the Lottery ballots, checks that the filling constraints are ful-
filled, marks the bottom of the multi-ballot, then it cuts the
multi-ballot in three, spitting out the resulting three ballots,
and also produces a copy of only ONE of the three column, at
the voter’s choice
6. the voter keeps the copy, and puts the three ballots separately
in the ballot box (which is of course is supposed to be regu-
larly shuffled to mix the ballots in such a way that nobody can
link together the three ballots to the original voter’s multi-
ballot)
7. once the vote is over, a summary of ALL the ballots is posted
publicly, together with the list of all the voters, and every vote
can check that her receipt is actually present in the public sum-
mary that is used to computer the election outcome
In the original paper, Ronald Rivest arguments that this protocols
allows the voters to spot frauds (modifications of the ballots) with
high probability by simply checking that her (secretly chosen) re-
ceipt does appear in the summary, while not giving up anonymity
because the receipt alone does not give any indication on the actual
value of the vote cast (for each possible configuration on the receipt
can be completed with two other columns in order to yield whatever
result one likes).
But what about the old 1980’s Italian trick? Let’s see: the boss will
come to you and give you a precise configuration you must use to
vote for him; this means a full configuration of the multi-ballot, not
BALLOT
... BALLOT
... BALLOT
...
...
President
...President
...President
Alex Jones # ... Alex Jones # ... Alex Jones  
Bob Smith  ... Bob Smith  ... Bob Smith #
Carol Wu # ... Carol Wu  ... Carol Wu #
Senator
...Senator
...Senator
Dave Yip  ... Dave Yip # ... Dave Yip #
Ed Zinn # ... Ed Zinn  ... Ed Zinn  
...
...
3147524
... 7523416
... 5530219
Figure 3. A sample filled multi-ballot from the Three Ballot
voting protocol: the votes go to Bob Smith for President, and
Ed Zinn for Senator.
just the receipt you may choose to take home.
3.1 An analysis of the ThreeBallot
After having studied in detail the Italan trick, we know what is
left to be done: we need (i) to check whether the boss has a large
enough “ballot space” available to tag every voter in the precinct,
and (ii) compute the probability for a voter of getting caught if she
decides to disobey, or, equivalently, what is the probability that one
of the tags chosen by the boss will come up nonetheless, even if
our voter decides to disobey.
3.1.1 Tagging space in ThreeBallot
Counting how many different valid ballots one can cast is not diffi-
cult: for a race with k rows and c ≤ k maximum choices, we have
the following possible outcomes
• ballots refusing all candidates: these have just one  in every
row, and there are 3 independent possibility for placing it in a
row, so we have 3k such ballots
• ballots choosing only one candidate: these are like the above
ones, but for the fact that, on one and only one row, we
find two  , that can be arranged in one of three different
ways only; so we can have produce 3k different single-winner
multi-ballots for every chosen row r, and there are k possi-
bilities for choosing the row r; hence, there are k · 3k single-
winner multi-ballots
• in general, for a multi-ballot designating k′ winners, we have(
k
k′
)
ways of choosing the k′ winners, so we get(
k
k′
)
·3k
multi-ballots designating k′ winners (notice that the formulas
for the two special cases above are specializations of the gen-
eral formula for k′ = 0,1).
• the number of possible valid multi-ballots one voter can
choose from is hence given, for c maximum choices, by the
following formula
mbk,c = 3k ·
c
∑
k′=0
(
k
k′
)
(1)
which gives, by the Binomial theorem, mbk,k = 3k · 2k = 6k,
and corresponds to the fact that when c = k there are exactly
6 possible configurations for every line, that gives again 6k
possible multi-ballots.
Observing actual US ballots like the one in figure 4, we see that typ-
ical values for k are bigger than 40, and typical values for c can be
bigger than 10. Our boss can then happily tag millions of different
voters.
3.1.2 Probability of getting caught
For this, we need to spend a little time analyzing what the struc-
ture of Rivest’s ThreeBallot implies on the probability distribution
of the ballots one may find in the ballot box at the end of the day.
We make in the following the simplifying assumption that the prob-
ability distribution of the multi-ballots is uniform10.
We first remark that each ballot that will be found in the ballot box
at the end of the election necessarily comes form a valid multi-
ballot (as the protocol checks that only valid multi-ballots may be
cast). This has precise consequences on the probability distribution
of the individual ballots in the ballot box:
• in an election where every multi-ballot cast is one refusing all
candidates, we know that all the k lines on each multi-ballot
have two # and one  , so the probability of seeing a column
with j occurrences of # and k− j occurrences of  is(
2
3
) j
·
(
1
3
)k− j
• in an election where every multi-ballot cast is one accepting
all candidates, we know that all the k lines on each multi-
ballot have two  and one #, so the probability of seeing a
column with j occurrences of# and k− j occurrences of is(
1
3
) j
·
(
2
3
)k− j
• in general, in an election with up to c possible winners, sup-
posing a uniform distribution of the multi-ballots, the proba-
bility of seeing a column with j occurrences of # and k− j
occurrences of  is given by
(1− pck) j · (pck)k− j
where pck is the ratio among the total number of occurrences
of  over the number of total positions in all multi-ballots
with k rows and up to c winners; the value of pck is evi-
dently greater or equal than 1/3 (obtained with 0 winners)
and strictly smaller than 2/3 (never attained, as it is a limit for
k winners), but since we have already undertaken some com-
binatorial show in this paper, here is the exact calculation that
formalizes and narrows these bounds:
10When this is not the case, the probability of getting spotted may
be higher.
– there are, by (1), 3k ·∑ck′=0
(
k
k′
)
possible such multi-
ballots, each with 3k positions, hence the number of po-
sitions in all these multi-ballots is 3k ·3k ·∑ck′=0
(
k
k′
)
– the number of  occurring in total is then given by
3k ·
c
∑
k′=0
(
k
k′
)
(k+ k′)
as we have in each valid ballot with k′ winners k oc-
currences of  (no line can be empty), plus k′ more
occurrences of  (for the rows designating a winner)
– so pck is
3k ·∑ck′=0
(
k
k′
)
(k+ k′)
3k ·3k ·∑ck′=0
(
k
k′
) = 1
3
·
1+ ∑
c−1
k′=0
(
k−1
k′
)
∑ck′=0
(
k
k′
)

This value is greater or equal to 1/3 (attained for c = 0), and
strictly smaller or equal than 1/2 (attained for c = k, where
by the binomial theorem ∑c−1k′=0
(
k−1
k′
)
/∑ck′=0
(
k
k′
)
=
2k−1/2k = 1/2).
So, 1/3 ≤ pck ≤ 1/2, and the probability of seeing any one given
column is between
(
1
3
)k
and
(
1
2
)k
.
Now, if our voter decides to resist the boss, she must change at least
one of the two columns for which she does not obtain the receipt
(the third one must be conformant to the boss’ request, as she is
supposed to turn it in to him).
So the probability PC of getting caught is equal to the probability
that nobody of the other N voters will by chance produce the col-
umn she decided to modify. We already know how to estimate this,
and we can properly conclude this section by stating the following
PROPOSITION 1. Using Rivest’s ThreeBallot voting scheme, it is
possible to sell a vote (or to coerce a voter), with probability PC of
identifying a breach in the contract in the following range
(
1−
(
1
3
)k)N
≥ PC ≥
(
1−
(
1
2
)k)N
where N is the precinct size and k the number of different rows in
the ballot.
With typical values of k (greater than 50) and N (less than 1.000)
from US elections, even neglecting the actual values of c, our hero
will be caught with probability greater than 0.999999999999. And
this, of course, assuming every other voter is choosing freely: voters
obeying the boss will surely produce ballots different from the one
our hero got, thus effectively reducing the effective value of N.
Notice that this is not the only problem with this voting scheme:
Charlie Strauss [Str06b, Str06a] and Andrew Appel [App06]
present various other approaches to break it.
Figure 4. Example sample ballot from an actual US election
4 Ballots as signatures in the main US elec-
tions
We are now well familiar with the ballot-as-signature attack based
on the Italian trick: we can perform it as soon as the ballot space,
the precinct size and the tallying method allow to construct a high
probability signature directly out of the very same ballot data that
is necessary for a correct tallying of the election, yet still allow a
coercer, or a vote seller, to cast a vote that is useful to the fraud
party.
If we look around a bit, we easily find candidates for an attack even
where the voting method has nothing to do with the old italian one,
nor with the cryptographically inspired Three Ballot method pro-
posed by Rivest. Indeed, the regular US voting method is a very
good candidate for another instance of our attack, and it is, as we
will see, quite an interesting candidate, as it uncovers yet another
conceptual error in the design of concrete voting protocols.
We have already looked at a typical US voting ballot, shown in fig-
ure 4, but we did it only in order to get concrete values for k and
c in our formula computing the probability of a signature for the
Three Ballot voting method in section 3, which involved determin-
ing the probability of seeing a particular column obtained from a
legal multi-ballot.
Now, let’s look again at this ballot and try to find a way to compute
a signature directly; our first remark is, a typical US ballot is mixing
elections of very different nature and weight: in the example ballot
of figure 4 we find 6+1 choices for president, 4+1 choices for repre-
sentative in congress, 3+1 choices for representative in state legis-
lature, 10+2 choices for the state board, and so on down the weight
scale until we get to 9+2 choices for the board of the state university,
3+1 choices for county clerk and 2+1 choices for county treasurer,
not to mention the different proposals that are to be found on the
back of the ballot (which is not reproduced here). The “+1” or “+2”
part in the paragraph above stands for the blank places where one
can mark a write-in candidate.
For any attentive reader, there is no point in insisting further: this
voting method is a real nightmare when it comes to anonymity of
the voter. . . given a large enough supply of names for the write-
in places, it is extremely easy to reliably tag a few hundred voters,
without even bothering to do any sophisticated calculation.
But even if we had no places for write-in candidates, it would be
overly easy to use the low-weight choices to tag every voter and
force her to vote for any chosen configuration in the high-weight
choices.
If we just take the example of the ballot in figure 4, we
have
(
9
2
)
+
(
9
1
)
+1 possible configurations for the board of
trustees, and
(
9
2
)
+
(
9
1
)
+1 possible configurations for the
board of governors of the state university, then 2 configurations for
attorney, 3 for sheriff, 4 for county clerk and 3 for treasurer. This
gives
T = 46∗46∗2∗3∗4∗3 = 152352
possible configurations to choose from to tag the voters, and force
all of them to vote for the same precise configuration in the high-
weight elections (columns one and two of the ballot). It is easy to
see that there are
V = T ∗8∗5∗4∗46∗56 = 516374528
possible different configurations for a ballot (excluding write-in
candidates), so, for each voter, the probability of getting caught in a
precinct of size N = 1000 when disobeying the boss’ orders would
be, (
1− 1
V
)N
=
(
1− 1
516374528
)1000
≈ 0.999998063423
And again, this is an optimistic approximation: the more tagged
voters comply, the more infinitesimal becomes the chance of not
getting caught, not to mention the fact that most untagged voters
will probably simply get tired of filling lines before actually getting
to the low-weight marks.
We can resume this analysis in the following
PROPOSITION 2 (PRIVACY PROPERTIES DO NOT COMPOSE).
Voting protocols that aggregate different elections of different im-
portance into a single ballot may seriously compromise the privacy
of the voters. Even if each election taken alone has good privacy
properties, the aggregated election using a single ballot breaks pri-
vacy with a probability that increases with the number of aggre-
gated elections.
4.1 On the boss’ strategies to overturn an elec-
tion
We have concentrated up to now only on the issue of determining
whether the boss has enough ballot space to tag all voters in a
precinct, and whether he can spot any potential voter resisting his
threats with high accuracy.
Once these conditions are satisfied, it is clear that the boss has a
means to violate privacy and anonymity, and can then mandate the
value of the votes of the voters he decides to threaten.
But then there are quite a wealth of different strategies that the boss
can choose from. If we focus on the US election example above, for
example, the following strategies offer increasing degree of control
at the price of a bit of creativity:
1. he can threaten (or instruct) the voters in a precinct, using
tags that will give winning votes only to the designated candi-
dates in the high choices: this way he gets the wanted result in
the high choices, at the price of giving up control on the low
choices;
2. or he can take advantage of the large numbers of ballot con-
figurations he can use as tags, and the complex composition
of the US ballot to actually determine the full outcome of the
vote by choosing these tags carefully to make sure in every
sub-race they give more points to the boss’ designated can-
didates; in the example above, one possibility among many
would be the following one:
• choose 930 uniformly distributed configurations out of
the 2116 possible ones for the first 2 sub-races (the ones
with 46 choices each); these configuration will give ap-
proximately 50 points to each of the 18 candidates in
these sub-races;
• construct the first 930 tags using just the first 2 sub-
races as the varying part of the tag and fixing the values
of the 4 smallest sub-races to the wanted ones;
• construct the remaining 70 tags by fixing the values for
the first two races and letting the others vary.
The net result is that in the first two sub-races the fraud can-
didates will have 70 points more than the competitors, and
in the remaining sub-races the fraud candidates will have an
overwhelming majority.
5 Signature attack for the Majority voting
method
A few months ago, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki proposed a
way to overcome the limitations of voting systems based on prefer-
ences expressed solely by means of ranked lists of candidates, and
Arrow’s limiting result [BL06]. This is achieved using a voting
method that allow each voter to express her view of a candidate in
a more refined way, by grading each candidate, using a common
language.
For a detailed exposition of their proposal, the majority ranking,
we refer the interested reader to [BL06]; for instantiating our
attack, it will suffice to remember that this method requires that the
voter grade every candidate using a grade g chosen from a common
set g1, . . .gn.
A possible ballot for voting using this method could be similar to
the one shown in figure 5: there must be exactly one  on every
line, indicating the grade that the voter gives to that candidate11.
With n grades and k candidates there are nk possible configurations,
11This method is undergoing a real-world testing for the 2007
French presidential elections while this author is writing this arti-
cle, using a ballot exactly like the one presented here; more infor-
mation can be found in http://www.ceco.polytechnique.fr/
jugement-majoritaire.html
MAJORITY BALLOT
Candidate Excellent Good Average Bad Very Bad
President
Alex Jones # #  # #
Bob Smith  # # # #
Carol Wu  # # # #
Senator
Dave Yip #  # # #
Ed Zinn # # # #  
Figure 5. Sample marked ballot for voting with the majority
method
of which (n− 1)k−w assign the grade Excellent only to w chosen
candidates; the boss than can tag (n− 1)k−w different voters, and
here again we have our limiting result for privacy:
PROPOSITION 3. In any implementation of the Balinski-Laraki
method using a single ballot, a voter can sell (or be coerced to
cast) a vote with probability PC of detecting a breach in the con-
tract, assuming all configuration uniformly distributed, given by
PC =
(
1− 1
nk
)N
This formula takes the following values in some realistic cases:
n N f rench presidential,k = 12,w = 1 US election,k = 50,w = 12
PC number o f tags PC number o f tags
5 1000 0.999995904008 4194304 < 10−17 7.55e+22
5 300 0.999998771201 4194304 < 10−17 7.55e+22
3 1000 0.998120091053 2048 < 10−17 274877906944
3 300 0.999435655844 2048 < 10−17 274877906944
Hence, the privacy offered by this voting method, as implemented
using the ballot presented here, is negligible under real world as-
sumptions.
6 Countermeasures
Can we design practical countermeasures to the ballot-as-signature
attack? The strength of the ballot-as-signature attack is also its
weakness: the signature is the voter’s ballot, when the voter’s
choices are complex. We will briefly outline in this section some
possible countermeasures one could take against the boss’ voter
tagging endeavor.
We cannot change the voting method (for example, by reducing the
voter choices), as this is a social welfare matter.
But we can try to decorrelate the voter’s original ballot (that carries
the signature chosen by the boss) from the observable part of the
ballot (the information actually made public when tallying, and is
the only information the boss get about the voter’s actual choice).
In the voting schemes presented here, at the price of some seri-
ous impracticalities, this may be attempted, with varying degrees
of success:
Ranked voting, Italian style : the voter has to cast 4 preferences;
instead of using a single ballot holding up to four preferences,
to be dropped in a single ballot box, one could use 5 sepa-
rate ballots, of different colors, to be dropped in 5 different
ballot boxes: one for the no preferences option, one for the
first preference, one for the second, one for the third and one
for the fourth; the voter will then cast one, two, three or four
ballots into the corresponding ballot boxes. At the price of
some mathematical gymnastics, one may still recover the cor-
rect tally (with preference transfer to the list as appropriate),
provided one carefully checks that the voter casts her ballots
according to the rules (she cannot, for example, cast a 4th
preference without casting a 1st, 2nd and 3rd one!). Now, the
observable part of the ballot is just the set of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and
4th preferences, and the boss is unable to check the presence
of the expected signatures as easily as before: he may still
spot a missing signature, but with much lower probability;
Three Ballot : we can modify the original protocol adding a ma-
chine that, after verifying that the multi-ballot is valid, will cut
it not only in columns, but along the lines of different sections,
or better, along all different lines; this way one effectively
breaks the boss’ signing ability; to retain the added benefits of
the scheme, each snippet must carry a different serial number,
and the copy of one ballot we bring home as a receipt, to-
gether with the serial numbers of the corresponding snippets,
will still allow us to check that our retained ballot really is
part of the tally; unfortunately, we now really need the serial
numbers to perform our checks, and a simple counter-strategy
for the boss is to team up with the maker of the machine that
prints the serial numbers to be able to effectively reconstruct
all the ballots starting from the serial numbers (this is much
easier than one would think: it is just a matter of agreeing
beforehand on some serial numbering scheme, and this is a
practical attack that would work very well on the unmodified
ThreeBallot system too);
US elections : here, the countermeasure outlined above (cut along
the lines the different ballot sections) just boils down to the
evident one: do not aggregate different elections; instead of a
huge ballot with dozens of choices, one should get dozens of
small ballots with few choices each;
Balinski-Laraki ranked voting : the same decorrelation tech-
nique will mandate to use a different ballot for each candi-
date, containing only the grade given to that specific candi-
date; if this author correctly understood the aggregation func-
tion sketched in [BL06], there is no need to know who gave
which grade to a candidate in order to compute it, so the tal-
lying will not be particularly more cumbersome than using a
single ballot, and one needs only use one ballot box.
Interestingly, the Balinski-Laraki method, that is presented as the
fairest one known, is also the easiest to practically and satisfactorily
implement in a way that avoids ballot-as-signature attacks. It would
be a good thing to see it deployed widely soon, provided, of course,
it is implemented as suggested above.
7 Formalizations of privacy properties and
the ballot-as-signature attack
The privacy and anonymity properties, with all their receipt-
freeness and coercion-freeness electronic variants, are notoriously
difficult to obtain, and this is why we find an increasing interest
in formal methods to actually prove or disprove them, possibly
(semi)automatically, for a given voting scheme.
One interesting work along this line is [DKR06], that proposes the
following approach to formalization and verification.
First, a voting protocol is modeled as a process of the applied pi-
calculus [AF01] having the shape
V P = νn.(Vσ1 | . . . |Vσn |A1| . . . |Am)
Here Vσi are the voter processes, all obtained as instances, via the
substitutions σi, of the same process V that contains free a variable
v, the intended vote of the voters; A j represent the different election
authorities, and n are channel names. The voting process V P will at
some moment make public the result of the vote (by sending it on
a designated public channel for example). One notes S[] a context
obtained from V P by suppressing any two voter processes.
Then, a protocol is defined to have the privacy property when the
following holds
S[VA{a/v}|VB{b/v}]≈ S[VA{b/v}|VB{a/v}]
In simpler words, a protocol is considered to respect privacy when
nobody can tell whether two voters exchanged votes.
In [DKR06] this definition is retained because it is considered to
have several merits: it is amenable to (sometimes automatic) for-
mal proof, and it is still satisfied even in some of the cases when
one ends up knowing the actual vote cast by VA and VB no matter
what the protocol is (for example, if the vote is unanimous).
Unfortunately, this definition lets seamlessly go through all of the
voting schemes we have analyzed in this paper: in no single one of
these it is possible to tell the difference among two cowards follow-
ing the boss’ instructions, and two lucky heros that both disobey
the boss but end up casting exactly the vote that the other one was
requested to cast. And yet, not any single one of these schemes
provide by any means, in practice, the least level of anonymity.
Indeed, if one looks at all the issues more carefully, the extremes to
which this proposed definition is not sensitive, like the unanimous
vote, or the single voter election, are nothing more than particular
cases of the ballot-as-signature attack: one voter elections is the ex-
treme attained with precinct size equal to 1, and then the chances
of getting caught when disobeying are also equal to 1; an election
ending in an unanimous vote is the extreme where the number of
possible ballot configurations is equivalent to one, and there also
the chances of getting caught are 1. But in between, with more than
one voter, and more than one observable ballot configuration, we
have a full range of privacy probabilities, that a satisfactory formal
model should properly account for.
We do not need a formalization that avoids the two extremes by be-
ing insensitive to them, but one that can explain and compute these
two extremes, and all the range in between them.
Of course, all this applies as well to the subsequent definitions of
receipt freeness and coercion freeness in [DKR06].
Building on the analysis we have done of the different voting
scheme, and on the ideas put forward about possible counter-
measures, we can formulate the following
REMARK 2. The anonymity of a vote cast during an election
strongly depends on the election method used; in traditional ranked
vote methods, anonymity is not an absolute property, but a proba-
bilistic one, which is a function of
• the size N of the electoral precinct,
• the number Nv of distinct votes that can be cast,
• the probability distribution of these distinct votes,
• the number Nov of the observable distinct individual vote out-
comes,
• the probability distribution of these observable votes.
This may give a first guideline for designing a satisfactory formal
specification of the anonymity property, even if, in practice, the
degree of risk the voters are likely to accept has also an impact
on the level of anonymity of the scheme, which makes a precise
estimate quite challenging, as this last element is in turn function of
the perceived probability of remaining anonymous.
8 Conclusions
We have presented in detail a powerful signature attack on privacy
and anonymity of voting methods based on the Italian trick: build-
ing on the lesson learned from actual election fraud occurred in Italy
in the 80’s, we construct a signature out of the very ballot data that
is necessary for a correct tallying of the election results.
This approach is clearly very different than the usual attacks on
privacy and anonymity in electronic voting protocols, where, by
the very nature of electronic voting, and in particular remote vot-
ing, one usually concentrates on possible information leak concern-
ing the identity of the voter coming from the authentication phase,
which can be complex and very error prone, but has nothing to do
with the actual content of the voter’s ballot.
It is also much more powerful: we have proven its effectiveness
against a wealth of voting methods: some of them, like the US
election system, have been in used for quite a long time; others were
proposed just a few months ago by top experts in cryptographic pro-
tocols on one side and well known economists and mathematicians
on the other side.
The attack described here makes it definitely clear that, unlike what
is done in a great deal of research works on electronic voting, one
cannot abstract away so-called details of a voting method when per-
forming an assessment of properties like privacy and anonymity:
the actual content of a voter’s ballot matters; the size and nature
of the possible voter’s choices contained in the ballot matters; the
precinct size matters.
As a consequence, before actually implementing any concrete solu-
tion based on the vast existing literature on electronic voting proto-
cols claiming to preserve privacy and anonymity, one should care-
fully check the precise hypothesis made by the proponents of each
protocol: do the good properties still hold as soon as one has more
than two choices (yes/no) when voting? what assumptions are
made about the ballot content, the public verifiability of the vote,
the precinct size? It might be the case that under some restrictive
assumptions the protocol really preserves anonymity and privacy,
and that the instance one implements violates these assumptions, as
it happens quite often when the implementation proposes multiple
choices or multiple elections in a single ballot.
We have seen in the case of the US elections that aggregating sev-
eral elections into one single ballot may seem a good idea when it
is difficult to bring citizens to the voting booth more than once ev-
ery few years, but is actually catastrophic in terms of privacy and
anonymity.
The lesson learned there is quite clear: privacy and anonymity do
not compose: if we have a voting method with a high probability of
privacy, for example a binary vote on a single candidate, or a single-
winner choice among several candidates, we cannot compose them
in a single ballot preserving the same degree of privacy.
We have also seen at length in all the examples given in this paper
that privacy and anonymity are actually probabilistic and not abso-
lute notions, so the current efforts at formalizing these properties
that are known to this author are not yet satisfactory: one needs
adequate formalisms taking these features in account when looking
for a model of such properties.
It would be probably beneficial not only to the research commu-
nity, but to the full population, if the arguments presented here are
widely circulated and discussed, leading hopefully to more secure
voting methods and/or protocols, but especially and urgently warn-
ing once again people that security is a risky business, and so much
so when properties like privacy and anonymity are at stake.
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